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Volatility and Unpredictability 
In the seven weeks from June 28 to August 18, 
the new issue rate on large 90-day Certifi-
cates of Deposit (CDs) fell over 600 basis 
points to 9.5 percent. All interest rates fell 
in late August. For Treasury bills, the rates 
reached a two-year low. Was the recent 
decline in interest rates anticipated by the 
market, and what caused the rapid drop? The 
answer is that the decline was not antici-
pated, and it is hard to explain the magnitude 
of  the drop even with the benefit of hindsight. 
Large, unanticipated changes in interest rates 
make even short-term financial transactions 
risky. That is why market participants closely 
monitor interest rates. They hope that a care-
ful reading of past movements will divulge 
the current objectives of Fed policy, help 
them to predict future interest rates, and 
allow them to divine the true state of  the 
economy. However, extracting informa·tion 
about changes in the real economy or mone-
tary policy from observed movements in in-
terest rates is almost as tricky as predicting 
future changes in interest rates. 
This Letter briefly analyzes the recent decline 
in interest rates. It examines and contrasts 
three factors: volatility-the absolute size of 
movements in rates, predictability-antici-
pated changes in interest, and ex post expla-
nations -whether past movements can be 
attributed to specific "causal" factors. 
Volatility: a historical perspective 
When analyzing the recent decline in interest 
rates it is important to keep in mind the past 
pattern of interest rates. Since late 1979, the 
volatility of interest rates has increased dra-
matically. From 1977 through 1979, the aver-
age (absolute) monthly change in gO-day CD 
rates was 33 basis points. From January 1980 
through Ju Iy 1982, the average (absolute) 
monthly change was 150 basis points. Vola-
tility increased approximately fourfold. 
In July, the monthly average 90-day CD rate 
fell by 120 basis points. In August, it fell by 
290 basis points. Viewed as isolated changes, 
these substantial drops appear to indicate 
something significant; however, viewed rela-
tive to previous monthly changes since 1979, 
the decline is not unusual. Monthly changes 
over 100 basis points occurred in almost two-
thirds of  the months since 1979. Changes 
greater than 300 basis points occurred 10 
percent of  the time. Cumulative two-month 
average changes exceeded 400 basis points 
20 percent of  the time. 
Volatility and unpredictability 
Volatility does not necessarily measure the 
unpredictability of a series. Some series have 
large seasonal or trend components that are 
easily predicted. For.example, strawberries 
are a seasonal product  with a sharply variable 
price. But it is easy to pred ict that the average 
price of strawberries in January will exceed 
the average price of strawberries in July. 
Predictable price changes, such as those due 
to seasonal movements, do not increase risk. 
If the changes were expected in advance, 
long-term plans or contracts could incorpo-
rate them. 
Financial analysts and the financial press 
gamely publish predictions of future interest 
rates, leading one to presume that interest 
rates, like the price of strawberries, may 
be volatile but predictable. The frequent 
reversals in opinion suggest, however, that 
accurate interest rate predictions are difficult 
to make. Participants in financial markets, 
nevertheless, must predict future interest rates 
every day; they put their money on their 
predictions. 
Any multiperiod financial instrument is a 
contract that contains an implicit bet about 
future short-term rates. The market's current 
prediction of future short-term rates is in-
corporated in the longer term rate. Any fore-()pinions (:,xpl"p')sed  in tl""lis  nevvslettef" do not 
necessari Iv reflect the views of thE'  managernent 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of San  Frc.1nc:isco, 
or of the Board elf  Covernors of tlw Federal 
Res (' rv  c.'  S  y:;; tern" 
caster who disagrees with the market's 
prediction implicit in longer term rates 
can make or lose a great deal of money by 
betting against the market. This is done either 
by selling or buying financial instruments 
or financial futures contracts. Moreover, if 
investors bet heavily against the market, cur-
rent rates will change. 
A two-period example illustrates the basic 
point. Consider a hypothetical case in which 
an investor can buy a 60-day CD that yields 
10  percent or two 30-day CDs in successive 
periods. The 30-day CD pays a rate of 10 
percent in the first month and 20 percent in 
the second month, giving an average yield of 
15 percent over two months. Investors will 
attempt to purchase the two 30-day CDs 
because the total yield exceeds the 60-day 
CD rate. Banks will wish to sell the 60-day 
CD. When the market clears, buyers and sell-
ers must agree on the same price. The yield 
on 60-day CDs wi  II rise and the total yield on 
30-day CDs will fall until the total yields for 
sixty days will beequal for both types of  CDs. 
The rate on the 60-day instrument is, there-
fore, the geometric average of  the two shorter 
term CD's. 
In actual financial markets, the future rate-
the rate for the second CD, is not known 
today and must be predicted. The current 
60-day rate and the current 30-day rate, 
called spot rates, are known. Because the 
market will equilibrate the yields on these 
two investment plans, knowing that the 
60-day rate is the geometric average of the 
30-day rates allows us to work backwards to 
calculate the future rate. For example, the 
forward rate-the 30-day CD rate implied for 
the next period -is  about 14 percent when 
the current 60-day rate is 12 percent and the 
current 30-day rate is 10 percent. 
If interest rates form a volatile but predictable 
series, forward rates will deviate from current 
spot rates, but forward rates will be accurate 
forecasts of future spot rates. 
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To assess the accuracy of the predictions 
implicit in forward rates, I subtracted the 
one-month forward rate for 90-day CDs from 
the actual CD rate that occurred one month 
later. I have used this difference to represent 
forecasting error and to measure the unpre-
dictability in interest (CD) rates. From 1977 
through 1979, the average (absolute) error 
was 36 basis points. From 1980 through July 
1982, the average (absol ute) error was 150 
basis points. By this measure, unpredictabil-
ity increased fourfold. The volatility measure 
discussed earlier and the unpredictability 
measure are virtually the same. One might 
say that random walks would have predicted 
as wellas the forward rate. 
Interest rates are volatile and unpredictable. 
The market did not expect rates to decline in 
July or August. In fact, forward rates for July 
and August show that the market actually 
expected an increase in rates. 
The chart shows what I call the market fore-
cast error for 1982. It is the difference be-
tween the monthly average 90-day CD rate 
and the forward rate predicted one month 
earlier. The July error of -161 basis points, 
while large, is only slightly above the average 
error for the two and one half year period 
since the change in Fed operating proce-
dures. The August error of - 336 basis points 
is a whopper. Nevertheless, the market made 
errors this large in about 15 percent of the 
months since 1979. 
Predictable vs. explainable 
Although there is ample evidence that 
changes in interest rates are extremely hard to 
predict even one month ahead, this does not 
mean that they cannot be explained. Ex post 
hindsight is usually keener than foresight. To 
explain past movements in interest rates, 
there must be a stable correlation between 
the unanticipated change in interest rates and 
the change in "causal" variables. If  the causal 
variables are unpredictable, they explain 
why interest rates changed ex post, but they 
provide no assistance in forecasting. VOLATILITY  AND  UNPREDICTABILITY 
OF  INTEREST  RATES 
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By working backwards, however, unantici-
pated changes in interest rates may provide 
valuable information about changes in the 
causal variables themselves. For example, 
economic theory posits that the demand for 
money depends on income (money for trans-
actions balances) and interest rates (financial 
assets are substitutes) plus other less impor-
tant influences. Therefore, changes in interest 
rates, which can be observed daily, may pro-
vide information about current changes in the 
real economy or in the Federal Reserve's 
policy intentions. This information is valu-
able because money and income can only be 
observed with a lag. 
As an example of an ex post relationship, I 
regressed the unanticipated change in CD 
rates on the monthly growth of  non-borrowed 
reserves, an indicatorof  monetary policy, and 
the growth in industrial production, an indi-
cator of real activity in the economy. The 
results showed that roughly 80 percent of 
the unanticipated change in CD rates, in the 
sample history period from january 1960 
through August 1982, could be explained 
by changes in non  borrowed reserves and 
industrial production. 
In july and August, nonborrowed reserves 
grew rapidly, putting downward pressure on 
interest rates. However, using the historical 
relationship, the growth in nonborrowed 
reserves only explained about one-third of 
the decrease in interest rates and industrial 
production was virtually unchanged. In short, 
most of the recent unanticipated drop in CD 
rates cannot be explained ex post by the 
simple historical relationship. 
Summary and conclusions 
Interest rates are extremely volatile and un-
predictable. I examined one-month ahead 
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predictions for 90-day CD rates using the 
forward rate as the market forecast. The aver-
age (absolute) forecast error over the past 32 
months was 150 basis points-a large error 
for a one-month ahead forecast. Forecasting 
further in the future would be even more 
treacherous. 
The unpredictability of interest rates makes 
financial transactions risky, their timing and 
maturity critical. Purchasers of CDs in june, 
for example, received a substantially higher 
interest rate than those who purchased CDs 
in August. 
An investor who believes interest rates will 
fall in the future would try to lock in the 
current rate with a long maturity intrument, 
while one who believes interest rates will rise 
will go into short maturities until the rate rises. 
The unpredictability in rates makes these 
term structure gambles extremely risky. 
The July and August rate decline was not 
anticipated by the market. Furthermore, the 
observed monetary stimulus does not seem 
to have been large enough to explain the 
decline in rates. The lack of a solid ex post 
explanation of  observed changes in interest 
rates makes investors and policymakers 
nervous. Does the decline signal a real econ-
omy that is weaker than preliminary data 
indicates, or have investors' expectations 
suddenly changed? In either case, what does 
it mean for the future? If  the real economy 
were so weak, why is the stock market boom-
ing? And if investors' expectations changed 
suddenly in the past, will they change again 
in the future? At the moment, the market 
seems to be hedging its bets-the August 
forward rate for September is predicting 
a 1 percent increase in CD rates. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELffH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts.in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed  ( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,852  6.5 
10,907  8.3 
6,538  16.7 
3,036  5.6 
499  2.2 
1,006  65.5 
841  14.7 
1,896  - 12.4 
329  0.8 
114  - 0.4 
1,573  5.3 
13,790  16.2 
12,080  15.7 
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